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Contracts and the Constitution
in Conflict: Why Judicial
Deference to Religious Upbringing
Clauses Infringes on the
First Amendment
Abstract
When a Hasidic person files for divorce under New York law,
either party to the marriage may invoke a declaratory judgment action to establish certain rights in a settlement agreement. If children
are involved, such an agreement may include a religious upbringing
clause, dictating that the child is to be raised in accordance with
their then-existing religion—Hasidism. Deviation from the contract
risks removal from the aberrant parent who intentionally or unwittingly allows the child to wane into secularism. Although the child’s
best interest is the cornerstone of custodial analysis, a problem
emerges when his or her best interest is couched inside a religious
framework, frequently leaving the court upholding continued Hasidic practice above all else. Because the First Amendment requires
government neutrality in religious disputes, a contract mandating
religious enforcement leaves the court in a bind, stuck between a
constitutional rock and a religious hard place. This Note explores
the potential constitutional and contractual conflicts implicated by
enforcing religious upbringing clauses in child custody disputes,
specifically in lower New York courts, as a result of deferring to
religious upbringing clauses.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Picture this: you are a vulnerable teenage girl, betrothed to a stranger you
have met only once.1 You have no real agency in the agreement, so its consummation is nothing short of rape.2 Your vows develop less into an infinity
of marital bliss, than into a grim, icy domicile.3 The space between you is
furnished not with roses, rhymes, and anecdotal tales recounting the ways he
loves thee, but with flying fists, lonely nights, and unilateral governance.4
You do not get to decide to leave, he decides if he wants to set you free.5
Worse yet, your confinement is reinforced by a second prison outside the
home: your own community.6

1. See Sara Stewart, I Was a Hasidic Jew – But I Broke Free, N.Y. POST (Feb. 7, 2012), https://nypost.com/2012/02/07/i-was-a-hasidic-jew-but-i-broke-free/; Tzack Yoked, ‘It Felt Like Rape’ // A Hasidic Woman’s Journey Out of an Arranged Marriage – and the Closet, HAARETZ (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-it-felt-like-rape-hasidic-woman-s-journey
-out-of-arranged-marriage-and-the-closet-1.5746428?=&v=09EB3A317C2763B01654D9BA534315
68&ts=_1546664124100.
2. See Yoked, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. See id.; Etty Ausch, How I Left My Hasidic Jewish Community & Found My Sexuality,
REFINERY29 (Jan. 9, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/orthodox-judiasm-sexuality-leaving-hasidic-community/ (discussing her “loveless, lonely marriage”); Josefin Dolsten, Netflix’s Unkindest Cut in “One of Us,” N.Y. JEWISH WK. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://jewishweek.timesofisrael.com/netflixs-unkindest-cut-in-one-of-us/.
5. See Masri v. Masri, 50 N.Y.S.3d 801, 802 (Sup. Ct. 2017). Under Jewish law, after the divorce
is finalized, the woman is required to receive a “get” from her ex-husband in order to remarry. Id.
Without it, she remains an “‘agunah’ (a ‘tied’ woman).” Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 527 (N.J.
1996). Whether the woman receives the “get” is typically within the sole discretion of the man, as he
can defend his actions as a religious ritual protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See id. In Afalo, the Superior Court of New Jersey stated:
It may seem “unfair” that [the husband] may ultimately refuse to provide a “get.” But the
unfairness comes from [the wife's] own sincerely-held religious beliefs. When she entered
into the “ketubah” she agreed to be obligated to the laws of Moses and Israel. Those laws
apparently include the tenet that if [the husband] does not provide her with a “get” she must
remain an “agunah.” That was [the wife's] choice and one which can hardly be remedied
by this court.
Id. at 531.
6. See Samantha Raphelson, When Leaving Your Religion Means Losing Your Children, NPR
(June 14, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/14/619997099/when-leaving-your-religion-means-losing-your-children (“People who leave the Hasidic community are often shunned by their family and
friends, but they also are often forced to fight for their children.”); see also Ausch, supra note 4. Not
only is the community unsympathetic toward domestic violence, but elected officials have also “been
accused of pandering to the Orthodox vote on issues like reporting sexual abuse.” Dolsten, supra note
4.
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Detached from outside influence, this ultra-insular community permits no
television, no internet, and no contact with the secular world.7 The only thing
you have is your children, and they are the very thing you stand to lose by
leaving, because not only will the community—including your own family—
band together against you, but the state would sooner grant full custody to an
absentee father than a mother who lapses in religious practice.8 Far from being the stuff of nightmares, this is the reality for Chavie Weisberger, Etty
Ausch, Sara Stewart, and countless other women who have gone “off the
derech,” that is, left the Hasidic community.9
Within the ultra-diverse boroughs of New York, Brooklyn has become
home to over 330,000 Orthodox and Hasidic Jews.10 The strength of their

7. David Shamah, Rabbis Tell 60,000 in NY: Get Rid of the Internet if You Know What’s Good
for You, TIMES ISR. (May 21, 2012), https://www.timesofisrael.com/rabbis-get-rid-of-the-internet-ifyou-know-whats-good-for-you/ (quoting senior Rabbi Wosner, who rendered the Halachic decision
that within the Hasidic community, “there [is] no justification for Internet use at home under any
circumstances”); see Sarah Maslin Nir, A Glimpse Inside the Hidden World of Hasidic Women, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/nyregion/a-glimpse-inside-the-hiddenworld-of-hasidic-women.html (discussing restrictions on women in the Hasidic community).
8. See Sharon Otterman, When Living Your Truth Can Mean Losing Your Children, N.Y. TIMES
(May 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/nyregion/orthodox-jewish-divorce-custodyny.html. At the trial level, Weisberger lost custody of her children “largely because she had lapsed in
raising them according to Hasidic customs.” Id.; see Dolsten, supra note 6; Harriet Sherwood, Agony
of Orthodox Jews caught between two worlds, GUARDIAN (Dec 2. 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/02/disobedience-film-orthodox-jews-lgbt-rights-rachel-weiez (“He was an
important man in our community. My parents gave me hell on earth – they supported him, not me.
My father made me feel ashamed of myself, disgusted with myself. I’ll never get over that.”); see
cases cited infra note 16 and accompanying text; Josefin Dolsten, Woman’s Sexuality Cut from Hit
Netflix Documentary About Leaving Hasidic Judaism, TIMES ISR. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/womans-sexuality-cut-from-hit-netflix-documentary-about-leaving-hasidic-judaism/ (describing Etty Ausch’s attempt to leave the Hasidic community, in which “the Hasidic community
band[ed] together, harassing her and raising money for her former husband’s lawyer”).
9. See Liana Satenstein, Off the Beaten Path, VOGUE (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.vogue.com/projects/13541582/american-woman-style-after-ultra-orthodox-life/ (“When
a woman comes out or is outed as not religious, she is at risk of being ostracized and having her
children taken away from her.”); Yoked, supra note 1; see also Ausch, supra note 6; Stewart, supra
note 1. It is also noteworthy that men, as well as women, are in danger of losing their children for
deviating from ultra-Orthodox practice. See Otterman, supra note 8 (“Julie F. Kay, a human rights
lawyer in private practice, said she knew of at least one court that issued an order denying a formerly
ultra-Orthodox father visitation rights because he showed up to a parental visit in jeans, which are not
permitted to be worn by the ultra-Orthodox.”).
10. Joseph Berger, Uneasy Welcome as Ultra-Orthodox Jews Extend Beyond New York, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/nyregion/ultra-orthodox-jews-hasidimnew-jersey.html.
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presence has morphed the previously liberal profile of the borough into a conservative enclave.11 The insular community has strict guidelines for the way
its women are expected to live.12 Despite the notable differences between the
secular West and its ultra-Orthodox pockets, there are many women who are
not only content with their religious lifestyle, but thrive in it.13 With that said,
the heart of the legal issue rests not in Hasidism itself, but rather, the laws that
make it difficult for women to stray from it.14
When a child custody dispute arises in Hasidic families, courts frequently
defer to the provisions provided in a divorce settlement agreement, in conjunction with a “best interest of the child” analysis.15 If the settlement agreement contains a religious upbringing clause—a document specifying that the
children are to be reared in accordance with a particular religion—the court
must give the document equitable weight in its multi-factored analysis to
avoid violating the state’s neutrality requirement under the Establishment
Clause.16 Further, under the Free Exercise Clause, parents have the right to
practice a particular faith and direct their children’s upbringing in accordance
with that faith, thus, to mandate a religious (or nonreligious) upbringing constitutes government overreach.17
This Note explores the potential constitutional and contractual conflicts

11. Id.
12. See generally Stewart, supra note 1 (discussing the general expectations of women within the
Hasidic community, including the required style of clothing and lack of autonomy). This includes
wearing clothes that cover them from head to toe (including wrists and ankles), shaving their heads
and wearing wigs, and having no permission to eat outside the home, or even to make contact with the
outside world. Id.
13. See Nir, supra note 7 (“The women . . . ‘take things that can be seen as gender roles and make
it something special. They are making it their own, making it into something they are proud of.’”).
14. See Raphelson, supra note 6.
15. See Sajid v. Berrios-Sajid, 902 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (App. Div. 2010) (stating “[t]here is no
‘prima facie right to the custody of the child in either parent,’” and “[t]he essential consideration in
any custody controversy is the best interests of the child” (quoting DOM. REL. L. §§ 70(a), 240(1)(a));
see cases cited infra note 16 and accompanying text.
16. See Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 274 (App. Div. 2017) (explaining a case
where the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision
to grant the paternal father sole residential custody, concluding that the religious upbringing clause of
the divorce settlement agreement had improvidently been a “paramount factor” in the Court’s analysis); see also Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 972 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the
government’s obligation to remain neutral when considering religion under the Establishment Clause).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Fam. Ct. 1989).
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implicated by enforcing religious upbringing clauses in child custody disputes.18 More specifically, this Note examines constitutional violations in
lower New York courts as a result of deferring to religious upbringing
clauses.19 Part II discusses the historical background to prevailing law.20 Part
III explores how precedential child custody cases within the jurisdiction have
handled religion, both with and without religious upbringing clauses.21 Part
IV analyzes this by discussing whether the Establishment Clause and Free
Exercise clause are violated by mandating religious practice.22 Finally, Part
V concludes by setting the constitutional standard for navigating religious upbringing documents in child custody disputes.23
II. BACKGROUND: DIVORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
When a Hasidic person files for divorce under New York law, either party
to the marriage may invoke a declaratory judgment action to establish certain
rights in a settlement agreement.24 In such communities, the agreement is
negotiated in a secular court, or in the Beth Din,25 and if children are involved,
such an agreement may include a religious upbringing clause.26 The clause
dictates that the children are to be raised in accordance with their then-existing
religion, deviation from which risks removal from the aberrant parent.27
Although the child’s best interest is the cornerstone of custodial analysis,
18. See infra Part IV, V.
19. See infra Part III, IV. This can be determined by comparing those decisions to appellate level
decisions within the jurisdiction. See id.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. 43 N.Y. JUR. 2D DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 115.
25. The Beth Din is a Jewish court. See Beth Din, RABBINICAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA,
https://rccvaad.org/beth-din/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2019). The Beth Din offers a full range of Jewish
court services, such as Jewish divorce and marriage services, similar to secular court. Id.
26. See Raphelson, supra note 6; Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 274 (App. Div.
2017). Such agreements are legally binding because New York courts deem these documents as enforceable contracts. See id. In these communities, such documents are typically signed at the time of
divorce and may include other antenuptial arrangements, aside from the religious upbringing of the
children. See id.
27. See Raphelson, supra note 6. While the law does not permit this standard for removal, lower
New York courts have nonetheless mistakenly applied the law in shifting parental custody for violations of the settlement agreements. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 274.
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a problem emerges when his or her best interest is couched inside a religious
framework.28 That is, when maintaining what the courts refer to as the status
quo (continued Hasidic practice) is “upheld [by the court] above all else.”29
Thus, whilst divorce settlements with such clauses are legally binding contracts, their enforcement raises the following key issues:30 whether giving undue weight to the religious upbringing clause over other custodial factors violates the Establishment Clause, and whether compelling a parent to raise
their child in a particular manner to gain custody violates the Free Exercise
Clause.31
A. The First Amendment in Child Custody Disputes
Under the First Amendment, United States citizens are guaranteed freedom of religion.32 The Supreme Court has implicitly bifurcated the Amendment into two clauses—the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause.33 The Establishment Clause requires that the government “shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion.”34 Therefore, rather than
adopting a policy in favor of church or state, the Establishment Clause divests
the government of authority to do so.35 The Free Exercise Clause, on the other
hand, provides that “the government may not ‘prohibit[] the free exercise’ of
religion.”36 Read in the context of child custody disputes, this means that the
28. See Raphelson, supra note 6.
29. See id.
30. See Bailey v. Mann, 895 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. 2008). “Settlement agreements become
binding contracts when incorporated into [a marriage] dissolution decree and are interpreted according
to the general rules for contract construction.” Id.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.
33. See Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent Confusion,
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 897–98 (2001).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
35. John C. Jeffries Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100
MICH. L. REV. 279, 292 (2001). Thus, short of embracing church-state jurisprudence, the Establishment Clause “merely reflect[s] a determination that the issue be settled locally.” Id. at 293.
36. Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014). Under the Free Exercise Clause, the
oversight of a religious upbringing clause also impedes on the aggrieved parent’s right to direct the
child’s upbringing according to their faith. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972)
(discussing how the Free Exercise Clause is tied to the “traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children,” and finding that “the values of parental direction of the
religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high
place in our society”). As such, to deprive a parent the right to raise their child by a particular faith
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court may not prejudice the right of parents to direct the religious upbringing
of their children.37
1. The Establishment Clause
Developing in the mid-twentieth century on the coattails of the Supreme
Court’s radical separation between church and state, the Establishment Clause
intended to effectuate a constitutional prohibition on governmental aid to religious schools.38 Since then, the breadth of separationist scope has extended
to require, amongst other things, religious apathy in disputes over child custody.39 Accordingly, two relevant questions emerge.40 First, to what extent
may the court consider religion in a custody dispute when no contractual provision exists to determine his or her upbringing; and second, when such a contract does exist, how much weight may a court afford it.41
When no contract exists, in the form of a divorce settlement agreement or
otherwise, the court’s paramount consideration is the “best interest” of the
child.42 As part of the “best interest” analysis, the court may or may not consider religion.43 When a divorce settlement agreement exists with a religious

would constitute an equally egregious constitutional oversight. See id.
37. See Wisconsin, 406 U.S. 205 at 233. While this Note focuses on the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with the Establishment Clause, the relationship between free exercise rights and parents’
Fourteenth Amendment substantial due process right to direct the upbringing of their children have
historically been closely linked—sometimes even confused. See Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise of Religion: Meyer, Pierce, and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP.
U. L. REV 887, 891 (1996). In the interest of brevity, this Note does not discuss any Fourteenth
Amendment issues. See infra Part IV.
38. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes:
Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV 1702, 1704 (1984).
39. See id. at 1702.
40. See id.; infra Part IV.
41. See infra Part IV; see cases cited supra note 16 and accompanying text. Put another way, the
second question asks in what way does the contract shape the scope of the analysis. Compare MICH.
L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1702 (contemplating religion in child custody disputes when no
contract exists), with Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 275 (App. Div. 2017) (overturning
the lower court’s decision to grant the paternal father custody after excess weight was given to the
religious upbringing clause).
42. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1702. Judges are typically awarded broad discretion to determine what constitutes the best interest of the child. Id.
43. Id. Although six statutes require religion to be considered in a child custody dispute, it is
otherwise typically within the court’s discretion to consider religion as a factor, absent a contract that
compels it to do so. Id.
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upbringing provision, however, the court is obligated to consider it under contract law, presenting greater difficulty in determining the extent of its influence and pitting contractual provisions against constitutional law.44 In both
instances, however, the overarching evil that the Establishment Clause seeks
to avoid is government overreach in private, religious affairs.45
To avoid such an evil, the Establishment Clause regards denominational
preference (lending favor to one religion competing with another) as “suspect
and . . . subject to strict scrutiny.”46 The Supreme Court has routinely stated
that the Establishment Clause also prohibits the government from favoring
religion to nonreligion.47 In child custody cases, the constitutionality of preferring a religious parent to a nonreligious parent can be analyzed under the
Lemon test.48 The Lemon test requires that: (1) the law “have a secular legislative purpose”; (2) its principle effect “neither advance[s] nor inhibit[s] religion”; and (3) it may “not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”49 In application, it becomes apparent that favoring the religious
parent almost always violates the Establishment Clause based on a failure to
meet the second prong.50 That is, since choosing a custodian on the grounds
of religious preference has the proscribed effect of advancing religion, it typically does not pass constitutional muster under the Lemon test.51 In sum,
courts may consider a religious upbringing clause as a factor in child custody
disputes, but may not give it undue weight.52
44. See cases cited supra note 16 and accompanying text. These considerations will be fleshed
out in Part IV of this Note. See infra Part IV.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Jason S. Marks, What Wall? School Vouchers and Church-State
Separation After Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 58 J. MO. B. 354, 362 (2002) (“[T]he Establishment Clause is inherently anti-majoritarian, designed to protect religious minorities from the tyranny
of the majority.”).
46. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1703–04. This strict scrutiny standard emerges in
Larson, discussed below. See infra Part III.B.
47. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N supra note 38, at 1707.
48. Id. at 1708; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon test, however, does not
exclusively apply to child custody cases, as depicted in Larson. See case discussion infra note 76.
49. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1708.
50. Id. at 1719.
51. Id. There is an exception to this rule under Larson. See discussion infra Section III.B, Part
IV.
52. See cases cited supra note 16 and accompanying text. Although the Establishment Clause does
not preclude the government from assessing religion in a multi-factored analysis, it does “require[] . . . ‘governmental neutrality’—'neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion.’” Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005)). Therefore, giving undue weight to a religious
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2. The Free Exercise Clause
Juxtaposed to the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause states
that Congress shall make no laws “respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”53 The Supreme Court has noted that the
“free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.”54 Entrenched in Free Exercise jurisprudence is the notion that, in a child custody dispute, the non-custodial parent’s right to exercise her religion—or no religion at all—cannot be
abated by the court.55 Deferring to a religious upbringing contract, then, strips
a party of their Free Exercise right by admonishing the parent to practice the
designated faith in order to maintain custody of their children.56 In this way,
a mother who lapses in religious practice by, for example, allowing her children to watch television when the community strictly prohibits it, runs afoul
of the contract and risks a custody war.57 Because the Free Exercise Clause
specifically protects individuals from religious (or secular) restraint, the government cannot, at its behest, coerce a parent into exercising a particular faith
to maintain unsupervised visitation rights.58

upbringing clause violates the Establishment Clause. Id. Giving the religious agreement undue weight
essentially means making religion a paramount factor—rather than a non-determinative factor—in
assessing the best interest of the child, as the trial court mistakenly did in Weisberger. See infra Section III.C.1.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, parents also have
a substantive due process right to rear their children free of state interference, absent a showing of
harm to the child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The [Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process] Clause also includes a substantive component that ‘provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ . . . [T]he interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
(2000))). In the interest of brevity, however, this Note does not discuss any Fourteenth Amendment
issues. See infra Part IV.
54. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
55. See S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Fam. Ct. 1989).
56. See id.; Otterman, supra note 8 (discussing Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265 (App.
Div. 2017), where the court noted that Ms. Weisberger’s constitutional rights were violated “by requiring her to pretend to be ultra-Orthodox around her children, even though she was no longer religious, in order to spend unsupervised time with them”).
57. Otterman, supra note 8. The Judge in Weisberger asked Ausch—whose children were placed
in custody of relatives—a series of question about her general fitness as a parent, including whether
the fuzzy socks she purchased for her children were related to Christmas, and whether she permitted
her children to watch a Christmas show. Id.
58. Granville, 530 U.S. at 57; see Otterman, supra note 8 (explaining that in Weisberger, the New
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B. Contractual Issues
The counter to this premise—that the government cannot mandate a parent to act in accordance with a particular faith—is that the lamenting party
contracted away her constitutional rights when agreeing to the divorce settlement.59 While a party may, on occasion, waive her constitutional rights, defenses nonetheless apply to the contract’s enforceability when it is clear that
one party was not privy to the contract’s terms.60 Lani Santo, a director of
social services in the Brooklyn borough, explains that “in almost every case
of individuals61 who are choosing to leave [the Hasidic community] . . . . [t]here’s almost always a contested divorce. . . . [In which] people
are signing things that are not explained to them.”62 Furthermore, unlike certain individual rights, because the Establishment Clause is a structural restraint on government, it may not be contracted away.63 For example, in child
custody disputes where a court unduly deferred to the religious upbringing

York Appellate Court ruled that “[the lower court] had erred in making religious observance the paramount factor when deciding custody”).
59. Jason S. Thaler, Public Housing Consent Clauses: Unconstitutional Condition or Constitutional Necessity?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1777, 1788 (1995) (“Although it is possible to contract away certain constitutional rights, the agreement must be voluntary. Courts routinely hold that
an agreement is voluntary unless it is the product of duress.”).
60. See id. at 1789.
61. Although this could feasibly apply to either gender, prevailing controversies consistently depict a Hasidic woman who is forestalled from leaving her husband by a communal effort to bolster his
legal platform and leave her unsupported. See Raphelson, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
62. Raphelson, supra note 6; see also Otterman, supra note 8. Discussing the religious upbringing
clause in her divorce settlement agreement, Weisberger states, “I don’t even remember seeing it.”
Otterman, supra note 8. If such an individual can prove that (s)he was taken advantage of, (s)he may
be relieved of the improvident contract by presenting a valid defense, such as duress, unconscionability, or undue influence. See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 3 (discussing the “effect of unconscionability or other defect in contract formation”). Although these examples provide defenses to the contract’s enforceability, there may also be an argument that no contract was formed for lack of mutual
assent, since “an offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.” Specht v. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Without mutual assent, a contract cannot be formed, since “[m]utual manifestation of assent . . . is the
touchstone of contract.” Id. at 29. Consequently, a party to a contract who has not had the terms
explicitly explained to them may also present an argument that the contract was never initially formed.
Id. at 29–30.
63. See Jessica Powley Hayden, The Ties that Bind: The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and
Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO. L.J. 237, 243–44 (2007).
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clause, a party’s consent to the agreement would not mitigate its unconstitutional effect, as a party cannot consent to government overreach.64
In sum, even if the religious upbringing clause is proportionately
weighed, its enforcement may still constitute a violation of the custodian’s
Free Exercise right to parent, and, if a waiver challenge is presented, a valid
defense to the contract’s enforcement may apply.65 On the other hand, if the
religious clause is disproportionately weighed, the structural restraint imposed
on the government by the Establishment Clause survives a waiver challenge,
since such constraints may not be contracted away.66
III. CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS IN PRECEDENTIAL NEW YORK CASES
Over time, New York Courts have reached contradictory decisions in
child custody cases, both with and without religious upbringing clauses.67
Identifying the cause of this schism requires a review of neutral principles of
law, the “best interest of the child” analysis, strict scrutiny standards, and relevant case law.68
A. Neutral Principles of Law and “Best Interest of the Child” Analysis
When adjudicating cases that involve religious disputes, neutral principles of law typically govern in order to avoid offending the First Amendment.69 This means that courts tend to apply “objective, well-established principles of secular law to the issues.”70 In this way, judicial involvement is

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See infra Section III.A–D. The most recent included decision with a religious upbringing
clause is Weisberger. See Section III.C.1. The most recent included decision without a religious
upbringing clause is Ausch. See Section III.D.1.
68. Compare infra Section III.C (examining child custody cases in New York with religious upbringing clauses), with infra Section III.D (examining child custody cases in New York without religious upbringing clauses).
69. Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahana, 879 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (N.Y. App. Div.
2007) (“In [applying neutral principals of law], courts may rely upon internal documents, such as a
congregation’s bylaws, but only if those documents do not require interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrine. Thus, judicial involvement is permitted when the case can be ‘decided solely upon the application of neutral principles of . . . law, without reference to any religious principle.’” (quoting Avitzur
v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983))).
70. Id. at 1285.
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justified when the case is decided “without reference to [any] religious principles.”71 To avoid implicating Establishment Clause concerns, therefore, the
court must instead defer to a “best interest of the child” analysis.72 This means
that when a religious upbringing clause exists in a child custody dispute,
courts in New York must not contemplate the propriety of the religious practice, nor the appropriate exposure to it, but instead the conduct of each parent
in raising the children, particularly in light of the consistency provided in the
child’s upbringing.73
In assessing the best interest of the child, courts in New York typically
consider a set of non-exhaustive factors, including the quality of the home,
the quality of parental guidance, the ability to provide for the child’s intellectual and emotional development, and financial status.74 When religion is implicated in the custody dispute, it may be considered alongside other factors;
however, it may not by itself be the determinative factor.75

71. Id.
72. Ervin R. v. Phina R., 717 N.Y.S.2d 849, 852 (Fam. Ct. 2000).
73. Id. Within their analysis, courts may consider religion—or a religious upbringing clause—as
one of the factors to determine what is in the best interest of the child. Id. In Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1982), the New York Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he only
absolute in the law governing custody of children is that there are no absolutes.” Id. In that case, the
Appellate Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to award custody to the father because the mother
was more interested in her own social life than her children, and because the mother’s actions “confused the children and [were] contrary to their religious beliefs and detrimental to their religious feeling.” Id.
74. See Sajid v. Berrios-Sajid, 902 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (App. Div. 2010).
75. See Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 991 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2014). Typically, religion is at
issue and warrants contemplation in the best interest of the child analysis when the child has developed
actual and specific ties to the religion, and those needs are consequentially best served by the practicing
parent. Id. By itself, however, religion is typically not enough to swing the pendulum in favor of one
parent, since credibility determinations play such a pivotal role in determining the best interest of the
child. Id. In cases where religion is the sole determining factor of a child custody dispute, an Establishment Clause violation challenge would likely ensue. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. This is the chief
evil sought to be avoided by the First Amendment’s separation of church and state. See id. Further
shaping the scope of the child custody analysis is Article 10 of New York’s Family Court Act. N.Y.
FAM. CT. ART. 10. The statute provides that a preliminary removal from the custodial parent is justified only by a showing of imminent danger or harm to the child. Id. In this way, religion as a determinative factor must defeat Article 10’s extraordinarily high standard by demonstrating that abstinence from faith would constitute such imminent harm to the child as to justify removal from the
non—or less—religious parent. See id. Typically, the standard for imminent danger is fairly high,
and cases where only some harm is demonstrated are insufficient to pass statutory muster. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 852–53 (N.Y. 2004). There, a group of mothers brought action
after a trial court granted removal of their children solely because the mothers had not prevented the
children from witnessing the domestic violence that they were victims of. Id. at 842–43. The Court
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B. Larson’s Strict Scrutiny Test
In Larson v. Velente, the Supreme Court introduced a new strict scrutiny
test, holding that denominational preference is impermissible under the Establishment Clause except when it ties to a compelling government interest.76
While the parameters of this compelling interest are not clearly delineated, its
attenuated nature can be inferred from the exercise of strict scrutiny—the
highest standard of review—underpinned by the Supreme Court’s conviction
that government regulation should be rigorously scrutinized when it infringes
on a protected liberty.77 In short, the Supreme Court concluded that the Establishment Clause prohibited the preference of one denomination over another, except in the rare cases where denominational biases were justified by
a “close[] fit[]” to a compelling state interest.78
C. Child Custody Disputes with Religious Upbringing Agreements
In the following two cases, the courts grappled with their latitude to interfere in predetermined contractual arrangements surrounding the upbringing

of Appeals of New York found that witnessing domestic abuse by itself does not give rise to a presumption of injury. Id. at 854 (“[T]he risk of emotional injury—caused by witnessing domestic violence . . . must be a rare circumstance in which . . . the danger [is] so great that emergency removal
would be warranted.” (emphasis added)).
76. 456 U.S. 228 (1982); see Jeremy Patrick-Justice, Strict Scrutiny for Denominational Preferences: Larson in Retrospect, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 53, 54–55 (2005). Justice Brennan delivered the
opinion of the court in Larson and began his analysis by stating that “[t]he clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”
Larson, 456 U.S. at 244. In that case, Pamela Velente sued the state of Minnesota for requiring, under
“the Act,” that all registered charitable organizations soliciting money file annual disclosure reports
with the Minnesota Department of Commerce (the Department). Id. at 231. The Department could
then withdraw or deny any organization that engaged in “fraudulent, deceptive, or dishonest” practices. Id. Velente argued that the Act infringed on the Establishment Clause and violated the Lemon
test both by having no secular legislative purpose, and by having the proscribed effect of inhibiting
religion. Id. at 251–52. This is because some churches were subjected to “far more rigorous requirements than others.” Id. at 258 (White, J., dissenting). While the District Court found this requirement
violated the second Lemon test by inhibiting religion, the Court of Appeals found that the requirement
violated the first Lemon test by failing to have a secular legislative purpose. Id. at 258–59.
77. See Mariam Morshedi, Levels of Scrutiny, SUBSCRIPT L. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.subscriptlaw.com/blog/levels-of-scrutiny.
78. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 244. What constitutes a close fit to a compelling state interest in child
custody cases with religious upbringing clauses is fleshed out in Part IV of this article; however, in
sum, this typically involves the state’s concern for the threatened well-being of the child. See infra
Part IV.
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of the parties’ children.79 In both cases, the contracts were ultimately left intact absent a showing of harm to the children.80 In Weisberger v. Weisberger,
the appellate court corrected the lower court’s constitutional blunder of shifting parental custody—thereby gutting the antenuptial contract—without a
showing that harm justified modification of the agreement.81 In Spring v.
Glawon, the court compelled the mother to remove her son from a religious
school on the grounds that it violated a (non)religious upbringing clause, finding that she failed to prove removal would be sufficiently harmful to justify
modification of the agreement.82
1. Weisberger v. Weisberger (2017)
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Kings County, New York awarded Naftali
Weisberger sole legal and residential custody of his children.83 Chavie Weisberger, Naftali’s ex-wife and mother to their three children, was awarded supervised therapeutic visitation after failing to comply with a religious upbringing document that required her to diligently observe the Hasidic faith.84 The

79. See Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265 (App. Div. 2017); Spring v. Glawon, 454
N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1982).
80. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 274–75; Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42.
81. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. The only justification for the state’s removal of the children from their mother’s custody—as stipulated in the antenuptial agreement—would have been to
demonstrate that remaining with their mother would cause the children harm. Id. at 275. Nothing in
the record demonstrated that the children in that case would be harmed by remaining with their mother.
Id. The holding of Weisberger may be somewhat confusing in terms of the contract-constitution battlefield due to its dual rationales. See id. Since the antenuptial agreement stated that the children both
would remain with their mother (Chavie) and be reared in accordance with the Hasidic faith, the contract had to be enforced unless (1) it could be shown that remaining in Chavie’s custody would prove
harmful to the children, and/or (2) it could be shown that continuing Hasidic practices would prove
harmful to the children. Id. Since the father, Naftali, was unable to prove that it would be harmful to
the children to remain with Chavie, removal was unjustified. Id. at 175–76. However, since Chavie
failed to prove that continued practice of the Hasidic faith would be harmful to the children, the religious upbringing clause was enforced. Id. at 275. Therefore, the state’s position of non-interference
absent a showing of harm was—by constitutional standards—correctly upheld by the appellate court
in Weisberger. See id.
82. Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142. Thus, state interference in religious upbringing agreements is
unjustified unless a contracting party can demonstrate that enforcement of the contract would harm
the child. See id.; Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. This standard is in line with Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 272. This included final decision-making authority over dental,
medical, and mental health issues. Id.
84. Id.
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parties divorced in 2009 and signed a divorce settlement contract agreeing to
joint legal custody of the children, while Chavie would have primary residential custody.85 Incorporated into the judgment was a stipulation directing the
parents to raise the children in accordance with Hasidic customs “in all details.”86
In 2012, Naftali moved to alter the stipulation of settlement so as to be
granted sole custody of the children, as well as to compel Chavie to act in
accordance with “Jewish Hasidic practices of ultra-Orthodoxy at all times.”87
In support of his motion, Naftli alleged that Chavie violated the religious upbringing clause of the settlement by coming out publicly as a lesbian and allowing the children to deviate from religious practice.88
During the custody battle in the Brooklyn Supreme Court, Judge Eric Prus
questioned Chavie for several days on her deviation from the ultra-Orthodox
faith.89 Ultimately, the court determined that Chavie’s transition had caused
a radical change of circumstances for the children, and it thus modified the
divorce agreement so as to award Naftali temporary residential and legal custody.90 The court also granted the father’s motion to compel Chavie to practice full observance of the Hasidic faith.91
Beginning its analysis, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of

85. Id. at 268. The divorce was implemented after Chavie confessed to being sexually attracted to
other women. Id.
86. Id. This included both inside and outside of the home, in a manner that was “compatible with
that of their families.” Id. The court also granted Naftali decision-making authority over which school
the children would attend, while Chavie was responsible for getting the children to school in a timely
manner and ensuring all their needs were provided for. Id.
87. Id. This included “sole legal and residential custody.” Id. Naftali alleged that Chavie’s “radically changed . . . lifestyle . . . . [D]isparaged the basic tenets of Hasidic Judaism in front of the children,” and for that reason, he moved to compel Chavie to act in accordance with the Hasidic faith
“during any period in which she ha[d] physical custody of the children and at any appearance at the
children’s school” in order to comply with the religious upbringing document. Id. at 268.
88. Id. at 269. This involved “allow[ing] the children to wear non-Hasidic clothes, permitt[ing]
them to violate the Sabbath and kosher dietary laws, and referr[ing] to them by names that were not
traditionally used in the Hasidic community.” Id.
89. See Otterman, supra note 8. Judge Prus’s questions included whether she permitted the children to watch a Christmas video, whether she included Easter eggs as part of a Jewish holiday, and
whether she used English nicknames for them. Id.
90. Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 272 (App. Div. 2017). The court described this
as a transition toward a “more progressive, albeit Jewish, secular world.” Id.
91. Id. at 269. The court demanded that Chavie practice “’full religious observance in accordance
with the [Hasidic] practices of Emunas Yisroel in the presence of the children,’ and ‘in . . . the community . . . [and] dress in the [Hasidic] modern fashion.’” Id.
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New York noted that modifying an existing custody agreement required a
“showing that there had been a change in circumstances such that a modification [was] necessary to ensure the continued best interests and welfare of the
child[ren].”92 The Appellate Division also delineated a non-exhaustive list of
factors that were relevant for determining what the best interest of the children
would be.93
Although the court conceded that a modification of the settlement agreement was warranted by a change in the circumstances, it nonetheless found
that the decision to award Naftali Weisberger sole legal and residential custody of the children “lacked a sound and substantial basis in the record.”94
With regards to Chavie, the court concluded that directing her to practice full
religious observance of Hasidic practices during periods of custody was

92. Id. at 273. “The best interests of the child[ren],” the court noted, are to be “determined by a
review of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (quoting Matter of Preciado v. Ireland, 2 N.Y.S.2d
594 (App. Div. 2015)). This standard is reminiscent of the neutral principles standard as upheld in
Spring, and the compelling state interest upheld in Larson, in which a contract between two parties
regarding their children’s upbringing will be scrutinized through neutral application of law unless and
until harm to the child is threatened. See Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (App. Div. 1982);
see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247–48 (1982). Here, the contract between the parties
stipulated that Chavie would have legal and residential custody over the children, and that both parties
would raise the children in accordance with the Hasidic faith. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 268. Deviation from this practice, then, would not justify removal, but instead a compulsion to enforce the
document—as ordered by the court on appeal. See id. at 275. As stated by the court, modification of
this agreement would require a showing of harm to the children. Id. at 273. Since it could not be
shown that remaining in the mother’s custody would be harmful to the children, there was no justification on the record for modifying the custody agreement. Id. at 274–75. In this way, the lower court
erred in removing the children from Chavie’s custody, instead of enforcing the religious upbringing
document. See infra Part IV.B.
93. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 273. These factors included: (1) “the quality of the home environment”; (2) each parent’s ability “to provide for the child[ren]’s emotional and intellectual development”; (3) each parent’s financial stability; (4) each party’s relative fitness as a parent; and (5) the
effect a change in custody would have on the “child[ren]’s relationship with the other parent.” Id.
The court also noted that the mother’s sexual orientation, which was raised at the hearing, required
neutrality from the courts, in order for the focus to remain on the best interests of the welfare of the
children. Id. The court also stated that the lower court’s determinations of the child’s best interest are
afforded great weight and are not to be “disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis on
the record.” Id. (quoting Trinagel v. Boyar, 893 N.Y.S.2d 636 (App. Div. 2010)).
94. Id. at 273–74. Supporting its view, the court noted that Naftali was unable to demonstrate that
awarding him sole custody of the children was in their best interest because their mother, Chavie, had
been their “primary caretaker since birth.” Id. at 274. Moreover, the court determined that the children’s intellectual and emotional development was strongly tied to their relationship with their mother.
Id.
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wholly improper.95 Relying on the Lemon Test in its analysis, the court reasoned that a person may not be compelled to adopt a particular religious lifestyle at the behest of the court, as to do so would be a constitutional violation.96
Further, the court found that there had been no showing that the mother’s
newly adopted lifestyle was in anyway harmful to the children’s well-being.97
The court ultimately reasoned that the best interest of the children was to
continue observance of the Hasidic faith, but to remain primarily with their
mother, as per the agreement.98 Finally, the court modified the religious upbringing clause to permit “each parent to exercise [their] discretion while the
children [were] in [their] care.”99
2. Spring v. Glawon (1982)
In Spring v. Glawon, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court enforced a religious upbringing clause stating that the child should be raised

95. Id. at 275. The court stated that it was “wholly inappropriate to use supervised visitation as a
tool to compel the mother to comport herself in a particular religious manner.” Id.
96. Id.; see Lemon v. Kurtsman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). To that end, the court explained
that “a religious upbringing clause should not, and cannot, be enforced to the extent that it violates a
parent’s legitimate due process right to express oneself and live freely.” Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at
275. To support its reasoning, the court cited to Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992), where the
Supreme Court held that a court could not “compel a student to participate in a religious exercise,”
and to include clergymen offering prayer as part of a graduation ceremony was not consistent with
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
97. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. This showing of harm is vital for Establishment Clause analysis, since Larson provides that the only exception for judicial interference in these categories of disputes—discussed at length in Part IV—is potential harm to the child. See infra Part IV. Since there
was no showing of harm, the religious upbringing clause maintained its force in this case, with a
modification so as to permit Chavie to extricate herself from the contract’s rigorous religious demands.
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.
98. Id. (reasoning that “the maintenance of the status quo is a positive value which, while not
decisive in and of itself, is entitled to great weight” (emphasis added) (citing Matter of Moorehead v.
Moorehead, 602 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (App. Div. 1993))). Additionally, the court directed Chavie to
“make all reasonable efforts” to ensure that the children comply with Hasidism, be it in response to
direction from the father or the school. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 276. Naftali was awarded final
decision-making authority over the children’s education and upbringing as it pertained to the Hasidic
religion while in his custody. Id. Additionally, the court found it to be in the best interest of the
children to keep a kosher home whilst in custody of both the mother and the father. Id.
99. Id.
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without religion, absent express written consent from both parties to the contrary.100 Dennis Spring, who is Jewish, and Adrienne Glawon, who is Catholic, married in 1968.101 Following their divorce fifteen months later, Glawon
was awarded custody of their son, Evan, with Spring retaining certain parental
rights.102 The judgment contained a stipulation that the child should have no
religious upbringing without express written consent by both parents.103 In
1981, Evan reached school age, and Glawon enrolled him into St. Joseph’s
Hill Academy (“St. Joseph’s”) over Spring’s objection.104 Consequentially,
Spring brought a motion to both enforce the (non)religious upbringing clause
and modify the agreement to award joint custody to both parents.105
In its analysis, the court reaffirmed precedential holdings demonstrating
that the court’s position was one of non-interference, and as such, the court
could not be compelled to intervene unless there was a showing that the
“moral, mental[,] and physical conditions [were] so bad as seriously to affect
the health or moral[ilty] of [the] children.”106
Glawon, the defendant-mother, contended in opposition that it was in
Evan’s best interest to attend St. Joseph’s, but the burden was on her to prove
that it would not be in Evan’s best interest to remove him from St. Joseph’s,
in other words, that it would be harmful to remove him.107 The court concluded that the agreement manifested between the parents as to the degree of
religious upbringing of the child was ultimately best left intact, absent a showing that enforcement would prove harmful.108 For that reason, Evan was removed from St. Joseph’s and the custody agreement between the parties was
left unchanged.109
100. Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1982).
101. Id. Their son, Evan, was born in 1975. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. St. Joseph’s was a Roman Catholic parochial school. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 142 (quoting People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 2 N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936)). Furthermore, the court noted that precedential cases had consistently upheld the validity of religious upbringing agreements, and that the party seeking to avoid or modify such an agreement has the burden of
proving that its enforcement is not in the best interest of the child. Id.; see also S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541
N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 (Fam. Ct. 1989).
107. Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142. To support this contention, “she submitted a comparison of
reading scores” between St. Joseph’s and other local schools, along with testimony about her experience as a public-school teacher for thirteen years. Id. at 141–42.
108. Id. at 142.
109. Id.
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D. Child Custody Disputes Without Religious Upbringing Agreements
Decided thirty-four years apart, the following two cases reach slightly
different holdings in child custody disputes without a religious upbringing
clause.110 In Ausch, the children were removed from their mother despite a
lack of finding that it would be harmful to remain in her care.111 In Aldous,
the appellate court found that the lower court had impermissibly entangled
matters of church and state by allowing its credibility determination of the
father’s religion to resolve the custody dispute in the mother’s favour.112
1. Ausch v. Ausch (2018)
In 2016, The Supreme Court of King’s County placed the children of Etty
Ausch, Appellant, in temporary custody of nonparty relatives.113 Etty initiated
her departure from the Hasidic community one year prior to the custody hearing, alleging abuse by her ex-husband, Eluzer (Respondent).114 When Etty

110. Compare Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489, 489 (App. Div. 2018) (issuing a temporary order
removing the children from the mother and placing them with nonparty relatives), with Aldous v.
Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (App. Div. 1984) (awarding permanent custody to the mother of the
children). While these two cases have reached different holdings, it is not necessarily accurate to
describe them as being directly contradictory, since they both involve a unique set of facts, and the
Ausch materials make it difficult to deduce how much consideration was given to the mother’s deviation from religion in arriving at the final custody determination. See Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489.
111. Brief for Appellant at 33, Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018) (No. 201609081).
112. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
113. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489. The Supreme Court is the lowest court in New York. Id. The
Appellate Division here references the lower court’s decision to temporarily place custody of the children with nonparty relatives. Id. Notably, the presiding Justice in this case, as well as in Weisenberg,
is Justice Prus. Id. Prus is an observant ultra-Orthodox Jew, and is often remarked as being “willing[]
to wade deep into the details of religious practice in his Downtown Brooklyn courtroom.” Otterman,
supra note 8. Currently, three of Etty’s children reside with her ex-husband, while the other four live
with relatives. See Josefin Dolsten, Why Did Netflix Cut ‘I’m Gay’ From Documentary About ExHasids?, FORWARD (Mar. 5, 2018), https://forward.com/life/faith/395816/why-did-netflix-cut-imgay-from-documentary-about-ex-hasids/. Etty motioned to vacate the order and regain custody of her
children, but the court dismissed the motion on appeal. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489.
114. See Otterman, supra note 8. During the trial, Etty’s family and close friends attended to testify
against her. Id. Those who have recently departed from Hasidism have opined that the community
“has become more organized in how it aids the religious parent and ostracizes the parent leaving the
fold.” Id. Like some of the aforementioned women, Etty’s changed lifestyle—including divergence
from religious practices and exploration of homosexuality—was the subject of investigation at the
proceeding. See Raphelson, supra note 6 (“In her custody hearing, she faced a series of religiously
pointed questions including one about fuzzy socks she bought for her children: Were they related to
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and Eluzer first married and had children, both parties were Orthodox Jews.115
In 2014, however, Etty was hospitalized for major depressive disorder, after
which point Eluzer separated the children by placing them in five different
relative’s homes.116
In 2015, Eluzer commenced matrimonial proceedings in the County of
King’s Supreme Court “on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown of the marital relationship.”117 During the proceeding, Dr. Adam Raff, the assigned expert forensic psychiatrist, testified that the children would “suffer emotionally
and developmentally if they were separated from their mother.”118 Nonetheless, the Court issued a temporary order removing the three oldest children
Christmas because they were dotted with snowmen?”). Interestingly, in 2017 the appellate court in
Weisberger admonished Justice Prus and the lower courts to remember that mandating a parent to act
religiously is unconstitutional. See Otterman, supra note 8. It would seem that this admonition was
ineffective, since only one year later, the same judge in the same court denied Etty’s appeal for custody
for failure to maintain religious practice. Id.
115. Brief for Respondent at 9, Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018) (No. 201609081).
116. Brief for Appellant at 14, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081). Eluzer alleged that Etty
suffered some post-partum difficulties after having seven children in eight years. Brief for Respondent
at 9, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081). Etty, on the other hand, attributes the source of her
anxieties to the alleged emotional, physical, and sexual abuse she experienced in her marriage. Brief
for Appellant at 12, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081). Etty also alleged that Eluzer was
physically and verbally abusive towards his children. Id. This includes “pinching and hitting the two
oldest boys, pouring hot pepper in their mouths as a form of punishment, and continuously screaming
at the three oldest children.” Id. Although Etty was released from hospital a month later, she alleged
that Eluzer refused to allow the four youngest children to return home, claiming that Etty was not
ready. Id. at 14.
117. Id. at 16–17. Three days after this, Eluzer moved to remove the three eldest children from their
mother, requesting that he have custody over them, or to have them placed with separate family members. Id. at 17. Notably, the motion was filed on a day when Judge Prus received the case as the
assigned emergency judge. Id. This is significant because Judge Prus presided over another case with
similar facts to this one (a child custody dispute with an allegedly homosexual mother lapsing in religious practice) around the same time. Id. In that case, Judge Prus allowed counsel for the Father to
cross-examine Etty—a witness in the case—about her relationship with that mother. Id. at 18. There,
“the Trial Court had previously made negative credibility determinations . . . and awarded custody to
the ultra-Orthodox father.” Id. Moreover, Etty alleges that the Judge permitted Counsel to “exploit
the Court’s intimate knowledge of that case and argue guilt by association against [Etty].” Id. Thus,
when Etty appeared in front of Judge Prus for her own case, her credibility may have been negatively
pre-determined. See id. Moreover, in New York, “[c]ustody determinations depend to a great extent
upon the court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, as well as the parties' character, temperament, and sincerity.” Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 991 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2014). Since Etty
had been impeached in front of the judge before her own case had begun, it can be argued that her
custody case was an upstream battle. Brief for Appellant at 17–18, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No.
2016-09081).
118. Id. at 22. Dr. Raff went on to state that it “was best for the Children to remain in the care of
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from Etty, and placing each with a different caretaker indefinitely.119
In appellant’s brief, Etty argued that the trial court’s removal of the children was unjustified under Article 10 of the Family Court Act, which requires
a showing of neglect or abuse by the mother.120 Etty argued that none of the
factors for the “best interest of the child” analysis—individually or collectively—demonstrated that it was in the children’s best interest to be removed
from their mother.121 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court, however, upheld the trial court’s decision in denying her motion.122
2. Aldous v. Aldous (1984)
In Aldous v. Aldous, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court held that the lower court had violated the Establishment Clause by impermissibly deciding on matters of religion in a child custody dispute.123
Plaintiff, Catherine Aldous, and defendant, Philip Aldous, married in 1971

[the] Mother, and with each other,” id. at 25, and “that the emotional bond between [Etty] and the
three eldest children was the bedrock for their sense of stability and that they must remain in her care
together for their mental and emotional well-being,” id. at 24. Nonetheless, the court conducted a one
hour in-camera hearing on June 30, 2016, during which the children displayed acts of aggression toward their father, such as spitting at him and stating “[t]his is all your fault.” Brief for Respondent at
20–21, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081). In response to this, the court believed it would be
in the best interest of the children to be away from their parents and “take a ‘time out’” for the summer,
and so issued an order memorializing this decision on June 30, 2016. Id. at 25.
119. Id. at 31–32. In the Respondent’s brief, Eluzer argued that the Court’s decision to remove the
children should be upheld, asserting that the removal was indeed in the children’s best interest. Id. at
29. Eluzer argued that at the trial level, Judge Prus correctly followed precedent by directing the
children to temporarily remain in the custody of other family members. Id. Eluzer argued that Etty
had alienated the children from her family, from him, and from the community. Id. at 30. Without
using the word “religion,” Eluzer described Etty’s “newfound beliefs” as imposing on the children
without contemplating the harm it would cause them. Id. Finally, Eluzer cited Dr. Raff’s testimony
in arguing that it was in the children’s best interest to remain in the Hasidic community to continue
the lifestyle they had hereto forth been exposed to. Id. at 30–31.
120. Brief for Appellant at 31, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (No. 2016-09081).
121. Id. at 33. Etty further argued that even if there was an actual risk of harm, such a risk must be
balanced against the potential harm removal might bring. Id. at 34. Moreover, she stated, evidence
must be presented to demonstrate that efforts were made to prevent removal where necessary. Id. Etty
argued that no efforts were made to prevent the removal of the children from their primary caretaker.
Id. Finally, Etty moved to vacate the judgment ordering removal of the children from her custody,
which was subsequently denied. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489.
122. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489.
123. 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62–63 (App. Div. 1984).
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and divorced a decade later.124 Together, the couple had two children, Kimberly and Jennifer.125 At the close of the initial child custody hearing, the
court awarded permanent custody to Catherine, with visitation rights to
Philip.126 In issuing its decision, the court stated, “[t]he lifestyle that [Philip]
has chosen revolving himself around his church is not what the children want
or need at this stage.”127 Ultimately, the court concluded that it was in the best
interest of the children to stay with their mother.128
On appeal, Phillip argued that the family court had entangled matters of
church and state by inquiring into the religious tenets of a custodial parent.129
On review, the court reiterated precedential authority holdings that religion
may be considered as a factor in the overarching “best interest of the child”
analysis, though it “may not be the determinative factor.”130 The appellate
court found that the lower court’s determination to award the mother custody
based on a finding that Phillip’s religious views were too discipline-orientated
was constitutionally impermissible.131 Nonetheless, the court affirmed the decision to keep the children in the custody of their mother on other grounds that
were buttressed by the children’s “best interest” analysis.132 Thus, the court
concluded that while the court’s endorsement of religious considerations overstepped constitutional boundaries, its analysis of other factors negated the
contention that religion “tainted the final determination of custody or caused
an abuse of discretion by the court,” as others factors strongly and sufficiently
supported the finding that it was in the children’s best interest to remain with
their mother.133

124. Id. at 61.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 62.
127. Id. The court further stated that “[i]f [the father] were to be awarded custody, [the children’s]
entire lifestyle would have to change to suit him and his new beliefs.” Id.
128. Id. To support its finding, the court stated that the children’s father was “more interested in
forcing the children to conform to his beliefs than in what [was] best for the children.” Id. The court
also noted that the main cause of the dissolution of the marriage was the difference in religious beliefs
of both parties, and, “in particular, the requirements necessary to fulfill the principles and practices of
the church to which [Phillip] is affiliated.” Id.
129. Id. Phillip argued that this entanglement was in direct violation of the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 62–63.
133. Id. at 63. In other precedential cases, courts considered but ultimately did not uphold alleged
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E. The Free Exercise Clause in Child Custody Disputes
In S.E.L. v. J.W.W., the New York County Supreme Court decided the
question of how to reconcile the right of a custodial parent to direct the religious upbringing of their child, with the right of the non-custodial parent to
freely exercise religion during periods of visitation.134 Soraya Esteban Lebovich (S.E.L.) and James Wilson (J.W.) divorced in 1987, resulting in custody
of their child, Natalie, remaining with S.E.L.135 J.W. was a Jehovah’s Witness
practicing “religious services, activities, and teachings.”136
In reviewing J.W.’s visitation rights, the court grappled with the level of
restrictions, if any, that should be placed on Natalie’s exposure to his religion.137 The court reasoned that, “[t]he right to free exercise of religion guarantees that a court will not make . . . a custody decision, based on its view of
the respective merits of two religions,” and, “a non-custodial parent’s right to
practice his or her religion will not be abrogated when the child visits except
to the extent necessary to prevent any harm to the child.”138
oral upbringing agreements. Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Div. 1987). In Stevenot, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held that absent a specified agreement
as to the children’s religious upbringing, the authority to dictate their religious training vests in the
custodial parent. Id. Plaintiff wife appealed a decision from the lower court, granting defendant husband’s motion ordering her to raise their two children in accordance with the faith of the Congregational Church. Id. The dispute centered around an alleged oral contract made before the marital relationship, and then repeated during it. Id. The agreement, however, was not memorialized in the
judgement of divorce, nor was it evidenced in any other writing. Id. The court stated that an oral
agreement that had not been reduced to writing would not be binding following the dissolution of the
marriage if the terms had not been included in a settlement or divorce judgment. Id. Finally, the court
stated that without a contract, the custodial parent was the appropriate arbiter of the children’s religious
upbringing. Id.
134. S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 676 (Fam. Ct. 1989). Although not an appellate division
case, the S.E.L decision is generally in line with Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence and can therefore
be used as persuasive authority in this analysis. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
136. Id.
137. Id. To determine this, the court looked to Free Exercise jurisprudence in its analysis, stating
that “[a] Court Order Which Adversely Impacts A Non-Custodial Parent’s Free Exercise Of His Or
Her Religion Would Be An Unconstitutional Infringement of First Amendment Rights When Based
On An Assessment Of The Merits Of His or Her Religion.” Id. at 677 (capitalization in original).
138. Id. In delineating between consideration of religion against other child custody factors, the
court cited relevant authorities that upheld the determination that, although religion is a permissible
factor for consideration in child custody cases, it may not be the determinative factor. Id.; see Aldous
v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (App. Div. 1984). Instead, the court reasoned, religion is to be considered when the child has adopted a particular religion, and its observance is better facilitated by one
parent than another. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
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The court parsed through relevant precedent and determined that where a
divorce settlement agreement existed pertaining to the religious upbringing of
a child, the burden of preventing its enforcement fell on the party wishing to
“modify or avoid” it.139 The court concluded that, because J.W. had agreed in
a stipulation of settlement “that S.E.L would have absolute custody and exclusive supervision, control and care” of their daughter Natalie, the burden
fell on him to prove that denying Natalie exposure to Jehovah’s Witness practices would not be in her best interests.140 In other words—that exposure to
his religion would not be harmful to their child.141
The next step of the court’s analysis was to consider whether J.W. had
waived his Free Exercise right by agreeing to the separation document.142 In
its analysis, the court stated that although it was sensitive to J.W.’s First
Amendment claim, “the situation is further complicated because rights of
Constitutional dimension can be freely waived.”143 The court reasoned that
when J.W. agreed to bestowing “exclusive supervision, control and care” to
S.E.L., he had effectively forfeited his free exercise right of practicing his religion during visitation periods.144 Finally, the court concluded that because
J.W. had contracted away his First Amendment rights, and because he failed
to demonstrate that exposure to his religion would not be harmful to the child,
J.W. would only be allowed to include Natalie in his Jehovah’s Witness services on Sunday without any further involvement.145

139. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679. The court reached these conclusions by comparing Gruber v.
Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 1982) and Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App.
Div. 1982), both dealing with separation agreements and their enforceability as it pertains to the upbringing of the child, with Bentley v. Bentley, 448 N.Y.S.2d 559, 559–60 (App. Div. 1982), where no
such agreement existed. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
140. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
141. Id.
142. Id. The court stated that such a right requires that the merits of each parent’s religion are not
evaluated in rendering the custody decision. Id. at 680. Further, the court stated that the Free Exercise
Clause “guarantees that no limitation will be placed on a non-custodial parent's right to practice his or
her religion when the child visits except to the extent necessary to prevent any harm to the child.” Id.
143. Id. at 679. See supra Section II.B (discussing waiver of Free Exercise rights).
144. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
145. Id. Nonetheless, the court found that while Free Exercise rights may be contractually waived,
such a waiver does not vest absolute religious decision-making authority to the other parent. See id.
While S.E.L had the legal right to determine Natalie’s religion, that right did not authorize her to
prohibit absolute exposure J.W.’s faith. Id. at 680.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. To What Extent May Courts Consider Religion in Child Custody
Disputes?
The first point of inquiry involves determining how much latitude courts
have to consider religion in child custody disputes.146 While courts look to a
number of factors in determining the best interest of the child, a judicial fluster
has historically occurred when determining the extent to which religion may
be factored into its analysis.147 In an attempt to smuggle religion into the “best
interest” analysis, a number of courts have historically considered a parent’s
religious practices as linking directly to the child’s temporal wellbeing.148
Other courts have made no such attempt to merge religion with the “best interest” factorial analysis, instead simply weighing the merits of one religion
against the other.149 Nonetheless, it has become clear that whatever guise re-

146. See supra Section III.C. The central cases for the purposes of this discussion, as mentioned in
Part III, are Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018); Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60,
63 (App. Div. 1984); and Stevenot v. Stevenot, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197, 198 (App. Div. 1987). Since the
Establishment Clause is a subsect of the First Amendment, this constitutional protection extends to all
states, and thus, the lens need not be narrowed to examine the governing New York standard alone.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Nonetheless, states may individually possess statutes that provide judicial
guidelines for how the best interest of the child is to be evaluated. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra
note 38, at 1702. The statutorily prescribed factors to be considered in New York are listed in Section
III.A. ((1) “[T]he quality of the home environment”; (2) the parental guidance provided by the custodial parent; (3) each parent’s ability “to provide for the child[ren]’s emotional and intellectual development”; (4) each parent’s financial status, including their respective abilities to provide for the children; (5) each parent’s relative fitness; and (6) the effect a grant of custody to one parent would have
on the “child[ren]’s relationship with the other parent.”); see also cases cited supra note 93.
147. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion as Factor in Child Custody Cases, 124 A.L.R. 5th
203, 203 (2004).
148. See, e.g., Blackley v. Blackley, 204 S.E.2d 678, 681 (N.C. 1974) (explaining that the trial court
considered the mother’s religiousness in order to determine whether the home environment would
encourage the development of the child’s mental, physical, spiritual, and moral faculties). One study
contemplating the link between religion and emotional wellbeing proved inconclusive. See Donald L.
Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 407 (1989) (finding “marginal support for a positive effect of
religion”). Historically, courts have used three different approaches to considering religion in child
custody disputes: (1) religion as advancing the best interest of the child; (2) religion as threatening the
child’s well-being; and (3) flatly preferring one religion over another. Jennifer Benning, A Guide for
Lower Courts in Factoring Religion into Child Custody Disputes, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 733, 742–45
(1997).
149. See, e.g., Reaves v. Reaves, 399 So. 2d 311, 312–13 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
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ligious preference takes, it risks running afoul of the Lemon Test if misguidedly applied.150
1. Religion as Merging in the “Best Interest” Analysis
The first subset of this issue asks whether merging religion into the “best
interest” analysis is permissible.151 At first blush, this would appear to be a
constitutionally viable determination.152 For example, considering the religious beliefs of the child himself and contemplating how those beliefs can
further the child’s welfare seems perfectly in line with First Amendment jurisprudence.153 Additionally, courts have jurisdiction to consider religion as a
non-determinative factor in its custodial analysis.154 The danger arises, however, when courts go beyond this narrow constitutional sidestep and instead
regard religion as positively impacting the quality of the home environment,
thereby casting a proscribed credibility determination on religion.155
In Aldous, the appellate court found that the family court had impermissibly “entangled matters of church and state” when it held that the children’s
lives would be negatively impacted by the father’s commitment to the church
and awarded the mother full custody.156 The lower court had cast a credibility
determination upon the father’s faith, resulting in a violation of the Lemon test
by having the principal effect of inhibiting religion.157 The appellate court in
Aldous forgave this constitutional lapse because, on proper consideration of
the factors, they nevertheless weighed in favour of keeping the children with

150. See MICH. L. REV. ASS’N, supra note 38, at 1708; supra Section II.A.1.
151. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
152. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 417.
153. Id. If the child himself states that he prefers one religion over another, placing him in the care
of the custodian who is best able to nurture his faith does not offend the First Amendment, since the
court is responding to the child’s preference, rather than its own preference. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
154. See supra notes 52, 138 and accompanying text.
155. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 417. Under the Establishment Clause, the government has no
standing to make credibility determinations about religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Equally dangerous,
still, is the converse premise that the presence of religion diminishes the home environment. See
Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62–63 (App. Div. 1984).
156. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 62–63.
157. Id.; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). When the court makes a positive
credibility determination about a particular religion, on the other hand, it has the proscribed effect of
advancing religion. Id.
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their mother.158 Because the appellate court is tasked with equitably considering the best interest of the child factors, and because those factors consummately proved the mother to be the appropriate custodian, the court correctly
decided Aldous.159 Nonetheless, Aldous represents a long line of New York
cases where appellate courts are forced to clean up lower courts’ sloppy constitutional blunders.160
In Ausch, Eluzer argued that Etty’s secularism would prove harmful to
the children, and it would therefore be in the children’s best interest to remain
within the Hasidic community.161 While the Ausch case is still ongoing, a
review of Establishment Clause jurisprudence reveals that these contentions
would violate the Lemon test—absent an actual showing of harm—by lending
judicial credence to Orthodoxy and allowing its heightened credibility to
swing the custodial vote.162
On review, the distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of
religion in “best interest” analyses seems to lie in the theory of religious
agency.163 If a child professes belief in a particular religion, and the court
158. See Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (“In sum, there is an abundance of evidence in this record to
support the determination of custody as made, and although the court's consideration of religion may
be impermissible in this case, its analysis of the other factors, fully supported in the record, negates
any implication that religion, as an issue, tainted the final determination of custody or caused an abuse
of discretion by the court.”).
159. Id. at 62–63. The court discusses “other grounds” that support keeping the children with their
mother, such as the fact that the children had been with their mother since birth, there was “evidence
of the degradation of plaintiff [mother] by defendant [father] and his parents when the children were
with him,” and “evidence of plaintiff's stable family life which permits her to care for the children all
day on a daily basis.” Id.
160. See supra Section III.C–D. In the cases discussed in this Note, the appellate courts are frequently correcting the lower New York courts’ misguided application of the “best interest” analysis—
impermissibly stepping on the First Amendments toes by making credibility determinations about religion, thereby regarding religion as positively impacting the child’s wellbeing. See supra Section
III.C–D.
161. Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489 (App. Div. 2018) (No. 201609081).
162. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–14. This would have the principal effect of advancing Hasidism.
Id. A review of Establishment Clause jurisprudence reveals that the government cannot overstep its
bounds by giving undue weight to religion in child custody disputes. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. A
review of precedential New York cases depicts a pattern of lower court decisions being overturned for
impermissible deference to religion. See supra Section III.C–D. Moreover, Lemon defines the relevant law—that the government violates the establishment clause where a law has no “secular legislative purpose,” but instead advances or inhibits religion. 403 U.S. at 612. For that reason, analysis of
Ausch is preordained with the presumption that inequitable consideration of religion will result in
constitutional oversight. Cf. 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489.
163. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 399, 417.
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finds that her faith is intimately intertwined with her development, the First
Amendment is not offended by a determination that continued religious practice is in the best interest of the child.164 This is because, in effect rather than
in application, the state is divested of its power of partisanship by simply advancing the wishes of the child—whether or not they pertain to religion or
secularism.165 In Ausch, however, the children expressed a preference for remaining with their mother, an endorsement that could not be objectively tied
to a demand for stringent religious development in the custody of an alien
caregiver.166
In sum, courts avoid stepping on the First Amendment’s toes when spotlighting religion in the “best interest” analysis only when responding to the
child’s self-professed religious demands.167 Otherwise, where religion creeps
into custodial determinations under the guise of the child’s best interest, but
the court determines on its own accord that the presence of religion would
either advance or inhibit the quality of the family environment, the second
prong of the Lemon test is implicated, resulting in a violation of the Establishment Clause.168 Therefore, religion may be considered a paramount factor if
it comports with the child’s preference, but it may not be the determinative
factor if it comports solely with the state’s preference.169

164. See id.
165. See id. Instead of the court having an opportunity to prefer a religion, the child chooses the
religion and the court memorializes this choice in its custodial order. Id. at 399.
166. Brief for Appellant at 9–10, Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d at 489 (No. 2016-09081) (“[T]he Children's
expressed wishes are to remain with each other and with their Mother . . . . The children have also
strongly expressed to their Mother, the expert forensic psychiatrist, and the caseworkers who conducted the Court Ordered Investigation ("COI") that they wish to live with her. The expert forensic
psychiatrist also opined that the three eldest children have a strong bond to their Mother and to each
other, and should remain together. The Trial Court erred in removing the three Children from their
Mother and placing them with three separate caregivers.”).
167. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 417 (“Seeking to determine and further the religious beliefs of
a mature child can both further the child's welfare, particularly the child's need for stability, and protect
a mature child's emerging free exercise rights.”).
168. See id. at 391–92, 417; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The Supreme Court
in Lemon determined the governments appropriate latitude in religious disputes. See id. Under this
standard, if a court makes credibility determinations about a particular religion in determining the best
interest of the child, a constitutional violation occurs. See id. For example, when choosing between
a Christian mother and a Jewish father, if the court deems the Christian faith as fostering a more
hospitable home environment for the child, the decision to award custody to the mother offends the
First Amendment by entangling matters of church and state. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 420–21.
169. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612–13; Beschle, supra note 148, at 417.
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2. Weighing the Merits of Religion
The next point of inquiry is whether courts may weigh the merits of one
religion against another.170 This issue arises most often in child custody disputes where both parents wish to provide the child with a religious upbringing,
but each parent practices a different religion.171 Discussion of the Establishment Clause hitherto should make it relatively clear that courts have no jurisdiction to prefer one religion over another.172 This type of improvident assessment is known as “denominational preference.”173 The rule against
denominational preference is best evidenced in Larson, holding that the government may not prefer one religion over another unless, under strict scrutiny,
such a preference is tied to a compelling state interest.174 The promise of Larson, however, has left a lot to be desired, and in application has proven both
dubious and inconsistent.175
Despite the ambiguity of Larson, the unconstitutionality of weighing the
merits of one religion against another has uncontestedly proven to be the bedrock of the Establishment Clause.176 Further, even if Larsons’s strict scrutiny
170. On its face, this appears to be quite literally the evil that the Establishment Clause seeks to
avoid. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
171. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400. Such cases are becoming ever more prevalent as the rate
of interreligious marriage and divorce increase exponentially. Id. These cases usually call for the
merits of one religion to be weighed against the other in determining which avenue comports with the
best interest of the child. Id.
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13; Beschle, supra note 148, at 400.
173. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 76, at 54–55. The rule against denominational preference is
grounded in “strong historical roots” and is (almost) unanimously considered to be one of “the most
fundamental guarantees of religious freedom.” Id. Even the most conservative members of the Supreme Court, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia—who have long criticized the notion of separation of
church and state—agree that denominational preference is constitutionally proscribed. Id. at 55. Despite the fluctuation among the courts regarding religion in the law, this is one area that most unanimously agree. Id.
174. See Larson v. Velente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); supra Section III.B. To recap, the Larson
court concluded that the Establishment Clause prohibited the preference of one denomination over
another, except in the rare cases in which denominational biases were justified by a “close[] fit[]” to a
compelling state interest. 456 U.S. 228 at 247. The identification of this compelling state interest in
child custody disputes is discussed in the remaining body of this analysis. See infra Section IV.A.2.
175. See Patrick-Justice, supra note 76, at 55–56 (“[L]ower courts apply [the strict scrutiny test] in
an inconsistent manner, and the meaning and correct application of the case [is] still unclear over
twenty years after it was decided. . . . Further, the case is not included in most casebooks on religious
freedom or general constitutional law and is therefore not well known to most emerging legal scholars.”).
176. See id. at 55; Larson, 456 U.S. at 244; Beschle, supra note 148, at 400; see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I.

806

[Vol. 47: 777, 2020]

Contracts and the Constitution in Conflict
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

test was to consummately materialize in a string of twenty-first century cases,
courts would be hard-pressed to deem the religious preference of one custodial
parent over another as a “close[] fit[]” to a compelling government interest.177
The only exception to this—and where Larson finds its force—is in cases
where a particular religion poses a clear and imminent threat to the child’s
well-being.178 In such a case, the compelling interest that gives constitutional
credence to judicial intervention in private religious affairs is the state’s interest in protecting the child from harm.179 Such cases, however, are rare, and
typically involve one parent’s conversion to an extremist sect, endangering
the welfare of the child.180
Larson’s non-interference-absent-harm standard frames the constitutional standard for considering religion in child custody cases.181 Thus, the
First Amendment means courts can rarely—if ever—weigh the merits of one
religion against another in making child custody determinations.182 The exception to this rule, as provided by Larson, is when a danger to the child’s

177. Matters of the religion in the home very rarely justify intrusion by the state for any compelling
interest, absent a showing of harm to the child. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400–01; Larson, 456
U.S. at 247.
178. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400–01.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 401; see, e.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Neb. 1981). There, the Supreme Court of Nebraska found that a mother’s involvement in an ultra-conservative sect created an
impending danger for the welfare of her child. Id. at 60–62. The mother—the defendant in that case—
believed that because her marriage was illegitimate, her daughter was therefore also illegitimate, and
proved willing to cut her daughter out of her life were she not to obey the rules of the church. Id. at
60–61. The court reasoned that because the child’s welfare was endangered by the defendant’s religious affiliation, it would be in the child’s best interest to place her in the permanent custody of her
father. Id. at 62. Burnham is an example of the minority cases in which a compelling state interest—
the well-being of the child—overrides the governments neutrality requirement under the Establishment Clause. See id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. I. Even though Burnham never explicitly mentioned
Larson or the strict scrutiny test, even a cursory reading of the case illustrates that the compelling
governmental interest of protecting the child from her ultra-conservative parent licensed the court to
prefer one parent over the other on religious grounds in determining the best interest of the child. See
Burnham, 304 N.W.2d at 61 (showing that during questioning, defendant was asked “if [your daughter] disobey[ed] the rules of the Church, [would you be] willing to cut her off from your life?” To
which she responded, “[i]f she disobeys the laws of the Church, I would” and, “[t]he laws of the
Church are the laws of the Church”).
181. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 244–46. Under Larson, the government is not permitted to prefer one
denomination over another unless the child’s welfare is in danger, in which case, the court would be
permitted to prefer the alternative parent’s religion by virtue of a compelling state interest—protecting
the child from harm. See id.
182. See Beschle, supra note 148, at 400–01.
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welfare justifies judicial intervention by a compelling state interest in maintaining the child’s wellbeing.183 In such a case, the court has standing to prefer
one religion (or secularism) over another, by virtue of the injurious environment fostered by the other custodian’s religious beliefs.184
B. How Do Religious Upbringing Clauses Alter the Court’s Analysis?
The pièce de résistance of this discussion calls for an examination of how
religious upbringing agreements alter the framework of the court’s analysis.185
Fundamentally, the Establishment Clause does not, on its face, serve as a restriction on judicial consideration of religious upbringing clauses in child custody cases.186 That is, the agreement does not per se entangle matters of
church and state, because the court is not creating a religious identity for the
child, but rather, enforcing an identity that was contractually agreed upon by
the parents.187 However, constitutional issues pertaining to these agreements
manifest when lower courts misapply the law.188 A cursory analysis of historical New York cases depicts a constitutionally viable avenue for enforcing
religious upbringing clauses.189
In Spring, the court enforced the parties’ religious upbringing agreement
in ordering the mother to withdraw her son from a Catholic school.190 The
court reinforced its position as one of non-interference and asserted that it
could not be compelled to intervene absent a showing of harm to the child.191

183. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247. In such instances, the danger to the child forces the court’s hand
to determine the better custodial parent by virtue of their respective religious practices. See Beschle,
supra note 148, at 400–01.
184. See, e.g., Burnham, 304 N.W.2d at 61–62.
185. See infra Section IV.B (fleshing out how courts resolve custody disputes when a religious
upbringing clause is present). The pièce de résistance refers to “the best and most important or exciting thing, often the last in a series of things.” CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/piece-de-resistance (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
186. See Martin Weiss & Robert Abramoff, The Enforceability of Religious Upbringing Agreements, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 655, 660 (1992).
187. See id. at 660.
188. See id. at 660–61.
189. See Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141 (App. Div. 1982); Gruber v. Gruber, 451
N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 1982).
190. 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142. The provision stated that the child shall have no religious upbringing
absent the express consent of both parents. Id. at 141. Thus, enrolling her son in a Catholic school
violated the contract’s provisions. Id.
191. Id. at 142.
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Looking at Spring, a viable angle for enforcing a religious upbringing agreement is through neutral application of contract law, unless and until the party
opposing its enforcement can demonstrate that such application would not be
in the best interest of the child.192 This theory comports with Establishment
Clause jurisprudence by blending neutral principles of law with the Larson
strict scrutiny test.193 The court neutrally enforced the upbringing clause without subjectively weighing one religion against the other (or here, Catholicism
against secularism), and took the position of non-interference absent a compelling state interest that justified disturbing the agreement.194
On one hand, Spring stands for the high bar of private contract rights in
child custody cases.195 That is, in cases where a religious upbringing clause
exists in a settlement agreement, courts are inclined to leave the document
undisturbed unless the party seeking to avoid its enforcement is able to
demonstrate that it is not in the best interest of the child to do so.196 In Spring,
even though St. Joseph’s was a demonstratively good school—seemingly better than local schools in the area—and only one block from his mother’s home,
the court ruled in favor of immediately removing Evan from the school and
enrolling him in a secular school in order to comply with the contract.197 On
the other hand, Spring poaches Larson’s strict scrutiny standard by giving it
constitutional force in the presence of religious upbringing agreements.198
This consolidated standard therefore states that unless harm to the child justifies state interference under Larson, neutral principles of law must govern the
contract’s enforcement under Spring, without reference to any particular religion.199
192. Id. Because the defendant-mother failed to demonstrate how enforcement of the agreement
would negatively impact the child, the court was constitutionally justified in upholding the religious
upbringing document. Id. at 142.
193. See supra Sections III.A, IV.A.
194. See Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142.
195. See id.
196. See id. Said simpler, the agreement will be modified or avoided only if the party moving to
avoid it can prove that its enforcement would harm the child. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id.; Larson, 456 U.S. at 244–46. Larson’s standard, as applied, denies judicial evisceration
of private custody contracts without a justifiable state interest. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247–48;
Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142. We have seen this standard set forth in denominational preference
cases—that is, the court may not prefer one religion over another unless harm to the child warrants
making such a credibility determination—however, Spring represents the first case in this Note where
Larson extends over to cases with religious upbringing clauses. See discussions supra Section IV.B.II.
199. See Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 142. Incidentally, that same year, the New York Appellate Court
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Thirty-five years later, this legal standard was aptly memorialized in
Weisberger.200 In that case, the appellate court found that because the lower
court had leaned on the mother’s transition toward a “more progressive . . . secular world” as a determining factor in removing the children, it
implicated the Lemon test in having the proscribed effect of advancing (the
Hasidic) religion.201 The court’s holding does not appear to abrogate the force
of the religious upbringing clause altogether—indeed, the clause was modified rather than expunged—however, the order was modified because the trial
Judge went beyond the First Amendment’s parameters by deeming a religious
environment as better serving the interests of the children.202 Thus, the trial
court failed to apply Spring’s neutral principles of law in enforcing the contract, and state interference was not justified by Larson’s strict scrutiny test,
because although the children’s best interest was paramount in determining
the issue of custody there was no showing that the mother’s lifestyle was in
anyway harmful to the children.203 Therefore, the court failed the Lemon test

reached the same conclusion in Gruber v. Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 117, 122 (App. Div. 1982). There,
the Court stated that “no reason appears why the provisions of the contract should be ignored.” Id. In
that case, the parties’ religious upbringing agreement provided that “the CHILDREN shall attend a
[Jewish school] providing Jewish religious training until the completion of the 12th grade.” Id. at 118.
On review, the Appellate Court found that “[t]he evidence in the record fail[ed] to support the notion
that a [Jewish School] education, per se, [would] be detrimental to these children.” Id. at 122. Without
a compelling state interest to justify interference, the court was bound by the terms of the agreement.
See Larson, 456 U.S. at 247.
200. Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 273 (App. Div. 2017).
201. Id. at 272–73.
202. Id. at 273. In doing so, the trial court missed the mark of the constitutional footsteps set forth
by Spring and Gruber in their neutral application of contract law. See discussion supra Section IV.B.I.
The only standing the court had to avoid the antenuptial contact, which placed the children in their
mother’s possession, was a showing that the children would be harmed by enforcing the contract and
remaining with their mother. See supra Section IV.I. No such finding was evidenced on the record.
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275 (“There is no indication or allegation that the mother's feelings and
beliefs are not sincerely held, or that they were adopted for the purpose of subverting the religious
upbringing clause, and there has been no showing that they are inherently harmful to the children's
well-being.”). Additionally, the court may have had jurisdiction to consider religion as a paramount
factor if indeed the children professed to preferring such an environment, and the mother was unable
or unwilling to accommodate this demand. See supra Section IV.I. Once again, no such finding was
evidenced on the record. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.
203. See supra Section III.B.I. The only reason the religious upbringing clause in Weisberger was
ultimately pulled apart was because both parties had authorized the court to disturb the agreement in
conceding that a change in the circumstances warranted modification. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at
273. The father in that case failed to demonstrate that awarding him full custody was in the children’s
best interest, and in fact, overwhelming evidence showed it would actually be harmful to remove the
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by preferring the father’s Hasidism over the mother’s “progressive” lifestyle,
and using this as justification for gutting the agreement and repealing the
mother’s residential custody rights.204
On reviewing the differences between child custody disputes with and
without a religious upbringing clause over time, the same standard seems to
apply inversely.205 When no agreement is present, courts may equitably consider religion in its multi-factored analysis but it may not prefer one religion
over another, unless a compelling state interest justifies such a credibility assessment.206 On the other hand, when an antenuptial agreement delineates the
preferred religious identity of the child, the contract is enforced unless a compelling state interest justifies disturbing the agreement.207
children from the mother. Id. at 274. For that reason, the religious upbringing clause had to be modified because its enforcement would result in harm to the children. Id.
204. See id.; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); discussions supra Section III.A.
The trial court erred not in considering the religious upbringing clause at all, but in considering it too
much. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 274 (“In pertinent part, the court gave undue weight to the
parties' religious upbringing clause, finding it to be a ‘paramount factor’ in its custody determination.
‘When presented as an issue, religion may be considered as one of the factors in determining the best
interest of a child, although it alone may not be the determinative factor.’” (quoting Aldous v. Aldous,
473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62 (App. Div. 1984))). Weisberger demonstrates that the current legal standard is
still reminiscent of Spring’s neutral-application-absent-harm standard, where Larson’s compelling
state interest finds its force as the only means to survive strict scrutiny of state interference in religious
upbringing disputes. See id.; Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141; Gruber, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
205. Compare Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (where no religious upbringing clause existed), with
Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 272 (where a religious upbringing clause existed); see discussion supra
Part IV.
206. See Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63. A clear-cut case where such a determination was viable was
in Burnham, where the court found that a mother’s involvement in an ultra-conservative sect created
an impending danger for the welfare of her child after she explicitly stated that “[i]f [my daughter]
disobeys the laws of the Church, I would [cut her off].” Burnham v. Burnham, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61
(Neb. 1981).
207. See Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. An additional difference in incorporating religious upbringing clauses to child custody disputes as it relates to the Establishment Clause is that without the
agreement, religion may be considered, and with the agreement, it must be considered. Compare
Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63 (where no religious upbringing agreement existed), with Weisberger, 60
N.Y.S.3d at 272 (where a religious upbringing clause existed). Because contract law governs the
enforcement of religious upbringing agreements, the danger of running afoul of the constitution presents a heightened challenge. See Weiss & Abramoff, supra note 186, at 656–57. The courts must
therefore contemplate how to employ contract law without violating the First Amendment. See id.
Nonetheless, this challenge is neatly sidestepped by applying neutral principles of law in the “best
interest of the child” analysis—that is, as per Larson, objectively enforcing the contract unless there
is a compelling state interest that demands its rescission or modification, which typically manifests
only in the rare circumstances where one parent’s religion is in danger of harming the child. See
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 247–48 (1982); Burnham, 304 N.W.2d at 60–61.
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C. Religious Upbringing Clauses Up Against the Wall: Free Exercise
Implications and Structural Restraints on Government as Reducing
Contractual Potency
1. Waiving Free Exercise Rights
The final point of analysis is considering whether enforcing a religious
upbringing agreement runs the risk of violating the Free Exercise Clause, and
if so, what rights are effectively waived by the agreement.208 In Weisberger,
the Court stated that “a religious upbringing clause should not, and cannot, be
enforced to the extent that it violates a parent’s legitimate due process right to
express oneself and live freely.”209 For that reason, the court exclaimed that
while it respected the parties’ agreement, the weight of the evidence did not
reveal that it would be in the children’s best interest to have their mother “categorically conceal the true nature of her feelings and beliefs.”210 Unbeknownst to the court, it had created a new standard for constitutional protections up against contract law.211 That standard suggests that even though a
parent has contractually agreed to raise her children in accordance with a particular faith, the court will not enforce the clause wholly, but instead modify
it to balance the children’s religious practices with the parent’s right to freely

208. See infra Section IV.C. As previously discussed, an obvious danger in enforcing a religious
upbringing clause—thereby compelling one parent to act in conformity with a particular religion—is
violating the protections of the Free Exercise Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Free Exercise rights
of parents are one of the most obviously protected constitutional rights in child custody cases. See
Beschle, supra note 148, at 414 (“Insisting that parents curtail religious practices or violate religious
precepts in order to gain or retain rights of custody or visitation raises serious constitutional questions.
Rules should be structured at least to minimize any interference with parents' free exercise of religion.”).
209. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. The court also spoke to parental due process rights in exclaiming “it is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.” Id. (citing Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)). While this Note has focused on the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with the Establishment Clause in the interest of brevity, the relationship between free exercise rights
and parents’ substantial due process right to direct the upbringing of their children have historically
been closely linked—sometimes even confused. See Bybee, supra note 37, at 890. As previously
discussed, free exercise issues typically occur when “a parent must choose between religious practices
and custody or visitation of children.” See Beschle, supra note 148, at 416.
210. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275. The court also found that it would be improper to “otherwise
force her to adhere to practices and beliefs that she no longer shares.” Id.
211. See id.
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express herself.212 Indeed, any other holding would traverse public policy,
and for that reason, Weisberger sets forth an attractive new standard for lower
courts to contemplate.213
The question remains, however, whether Chavie—the mother in Weisberger—and other parents in her position waived their constitutional protections in signing the religious upbringing document.214 As previously discussed, a party may forgo his Free Exercise rights by entering into an
agreement that effectively nullifies those rights.215 In this way, contractual
provisions may defeat constitutional protections.216 In bringing a Free Exercise challenge to the enforcement of a religious upbringing clause, then, the
very obvious response is to produce the document itself, with the complainant’s signature, as evidence of the rights forgone.217
In S.E.L., the New York Supreme Court found that while “[a] Court Order
Which Adversely Impacts A Non-Custodial Parent’s Free Exercise Of His Or
Her Religion Would Be An Unconstitutional Infringement of First Amendment Rights,”218 equally relevant was the fact that J.W., the father, had agreed
in a stipulation of settlement that S.E.L, the mother, would have “absolute

212. Id. at 276. The agreement was modified to require that the mother still maintain a Kosher diet
in the home at all times, but permitted both parents to otherwise exercise discretion while having the
children in their custody. Id.
213. See id. at 275–76. Any public policy concerns related to religious upbringing agreements lie
not within the formation of the agreement itself, but instead, in its enforcement. See Alexandra
Selfridge, Challenges for Negotiating and Drafting an Antenuptial Agreement for the Religious Upbringing of Future Children, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 91, 92 (2007). In enforcing the contract,
then, the court must temper public policy concerns by ensuring that parents’ First Amendment rights
are not inadvertently flattened. See id. (“No court has held that agreements between parents about
their children's religious upbringing violate public policy or the criminal law. The ‘public policy’
issue does not relate to the substance of the agreement, but rather to the enforceability of the agreement
in the courts.”).
214. See Karel Rocha, Should Religious Upbringing Antenuptial Agreements Be Legally Enforceable?, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 149 (2000) (discussing whether Free Exercise rights are
waived in contractual agreements).
215. See supra Section II.B.
216. See Thaler, supra note 59, at 1788. This is less likely to be true if the contractual arrangement
is made orally. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); infra note 241
and accompanying text.
217. See Rocha, supra note 214, at 149 (“[T]he most justifiable infringement is that which the parties have chosen for themselves, rather than that which the court imposes upon them.” (quoting Jocelyn
Strauber, A Deal Is a Deal: Antenuptial Agreements Regarding the Religious Upbringing of Children
Should Be Enforceable, 47 DUKE L.J. 971, 1006–07 (1998))).
218. S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Fam. Ct. 1989) (capitalization in original).
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custody and exclusive supervision” of their daughter Natalie.219 The court
concluded that because J.W. had agreed to abandon parental authority in the
contract, he had forfeited his free exercise right of practicing his religion during visitation periods.220
S.E.L. stands for the proposition that religious freedom, as protected by
the Free Exercise Clause, is discernably waived through freedom of contracting—pitting contract law above constitutional law—while Weisberger,
twenty-eight years later, takes a slightly more sensitive approach in holding
that a parent cannot be compelled to practice religion in order to maintain
unsupervised custody, allowing constitutional protections to defeat contract
law.221 Perhaps, however, these disparate holdings can be attributed to the
notable differences between the two cases.222 In S.E.L, the father wished to
expose his daughter to Jehovah’s Witness practices, and failed to show how
this exposure would not harm her.223 In Weisberger, however, short of wanting to expose her children to a new or different faith, the mother in that case
wished simply not to feign religious practice in front of her children in order
to maintain custody.224 Thus, less leniency is seemingly granted where a parent is attempting to expose her child to a new or existing religion, as in S.E.L.,
than if a parent is attempting to extricate herself from the rigidity of an ultraconservative practice, as in Weisberger.225 In sum, when considering the Free
Exercise Clause in relation to religious upbringing clauses, modern courts are
rightly shifting toward a standard of fairness, and weighing constitutional protections as a heavier priority over contractual provisions.226

219. Id. at 679.
220. Id.
221. Compare Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 275 (App. Div. 2017), with S.E.L., 541
N.Y.S.2d at 679.
222. Compare Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275, with S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
223. S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
224. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.
225. Compare Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275, with S.E.L., 541 N.Y.S.2d at 679. Additionally, the
court in Weisberger likely took stock of the fact that the mother, there, was not privy to the terms of
the contract, and therefore holding her to the agreement would be unconscionable. See Raphelson,
supra note 6; Otterman, supra note 8. For that reason, courts likely consider the level of agency in
contractual agreements before determining whether Free Exercise rights have been effectively waived.
See supra Section II.B.
226. See Rocha, supra note 214, at 150.
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2. Defenses to Waiver Challenges and Structural
Restraints on Government
Even in the face of a waiver challenge, a party may provide contract defenses to counter the agreement’s enforceability.227 As in Weisberger, Chavie
and many other women in her position have been the victim of an antenuptial
agreement, rather than the proponent of it.228 Whether defenses of duress or
unconscionability apply are case specific inquiries, and depending on the viability of the defense, may serve to vitiate the contract altogether.229
However, although it is clear that in certain circumstances a person may
waive their Free Exercise right, and indeed, the court may in its discretion
uphold such a waiver in enforcing the agreement, the potency of the contract
is nonetheless diminished by structural restraints imposed on the government.230 That is to say, while a person may waive her free exercise right, she
may not waive the neutrality requirement imposed on the government in constraining entanglement of church and state.231 For that reason, if the state
oversteps its bounds by giving judicial deference to religion in child custody
disputes, as did the trial court in Weisberger, no contractual provision can
relieve the trial judge of his constitutional transgression.232 Thus, while a person’s free exercise rights may be contractually waived, the Establishment
Clause’s structural restraint on government maintains its force over religion
in the courtroom, diminishing the efficacy of the agreement’s force.233

227. See supra Section III.C.
228. See Otterman, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion
Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1035,
1092 (2010) (“[O]ne who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms might be held to
assume the risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining
power . . . signs a[n] . . . unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly
likely that his consent . . . was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of
the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether
the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.” (quoting Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965))).
230. See Hayden, supra note 63, at 243–44.
231. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
232. See Hayden, supra note 63, at 243–44.
233. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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V. CONCLUSION
So, what becomes of the vulnerable teenager who married a stranger she
met but once?234 What becomes of the autonomy she lost over her body, her
faith, and the children she bore?235 Is her latent realization of the woman she
wanted to be crippled by her consent to a life she wants to forget?236 Lower
New York courts have continuously said yes, but appellate courts have constitutionally said no.237
When religious upbringing clauses bring contracts and the Constitution
into conflict by compelling courts to consider religion, the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment guarantees that, although religion is a contractually obligatory point of consideration, it cannot be the determinative factor
in child custody decisions.238
234. See Yoked, supra note 1.
235. See id.; Dolsten, supra note 6 and accompanying text; Ausch, supra note 6.
236. In the two most current cases discussed, the mother made the decision to come out as a lesbian
and leave the Hasidic community. See Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489, 489–90 (App. Div. 2018);
Weisberger v. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d 265, 268–69 (App. Div. 2017); see also Ausch, supra note 6.
In Weisberger, the mother was held to the signature on her antenuptial contract that promised to raise
the children in accordance with the Hasidic faith. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 276.
237. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275–76; Spring v. Glawon, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141–42 (App. Div.
1982). Although the religious upbringing clause was enforced in those cases, there was no holding
that the mother had to conform with the stipulated religion. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275–76;
Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42.
238. See Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (App. Div. 1984); Gribeluk v. Gribeluk, 991
N.Y.S.2d 117, 118 (App. Div. 2014). In New York courts, if the antenuptial agreement states that the
mother shall be the primary legal custodian, deviation from the religious upbringing clause will not
warrant removal under the First Amendment or Article 10, but instead, the clause will be enforced to
the extent that the children—not the mother—must continue their religious training while in their
mother’s care. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.; N.Y. FAM. CT. ART. 10 (2019); supra note 75 and accompanying text. It is also noteworthy that while this holding may be typical in New York cases, many
courts outside of New York disregard the clause altogether for being vague or ambiguous. See Zummo
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“1) [S]uch agreements are generally too vague
to demonstrate a meeting of minds, or to provide an adequate basis for objective enforcement; 2)
enforcement of such an agreement would promote a particular religion, serve little or no secular purpose, and would excessively entangle the courts in religious matters; and, 3) enforcement would be
contrary to a public policy embodied in the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses . . . that parents be free to doubt, question, and change their beliefs, and that they be free
to instruct their children in accordance with those beliefs.”). Although the contract in Zummo was an
oral agreement, which counted against enforcement, the court there nonetheless spoke of public policy
concerns that are not mentioned in precedential New York holdings. Compare id. (where the religious
upbringing agreement was not enforced, inter alia, due to public policy concerns that parents should
be free to change their minds about their children’s upbringing), with Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275–
76, and Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42 (enforcing a religious upbringing document despite the
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Although preferring one religion over another would have the proscribed
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, thereby failing the Lemon test, Larson carves out an exception to this rule in circumstances where protecting the
child’s well-being becomes a compelling state interest.239 Weisberger consolidates precedential New York holdings into the current state of legal analysis
by finding that religion may not be the determinative factor for consideration;240 the state may only interfere in private religious affairs if the child’s
welfare is at stake;241 and neutral principles of law must govern over religious
upbringing agreements in child custody disputes.242 The application of these
neutral principles typically means that the contract will be left undisturbed as
it pertains to the religious identity of the child, but a softened standard attaches
to the religious identity of a parent who may have unwittingly waived her Free
Exercise rights in signing the contract.243
While a person’s free exercise rights may be contractually waived, the
Establishment Clause’s structural restraint on government maintains its force
over religion in the courtroom.244 In this way, while parents may not be free
from waiver challenges to their Free Exercise rights, they are absolutely free
from the danger of judicial deference to a religious upbringing clause.245
Thus, giving undue weight to religious upbringing clauses in child custody
cases violates the First Amendment of the Constitution, and even in the presence of contractual agreements, such a violation always survives a waiver
challenge.246

mother in both cases changing her mind about her children’s upbringing).
239. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); see also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 244, 246–47 (1982). This holding was ratified in Spring, alongside an application of “neutral
principles of law” to contract enforcement. See Spring, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 141–42; Larson, 456 U.S. at
244.
240. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
241. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246–47. While this type of harm is usually in the context of a parent who
joins an ultra-conservative sect that threatens punishment to the child, see Burnham v. Burnham, 304
N.W.2d 58, 60 (Neb. 1981), some courts find that divorced parents increase the risk of an injurious
environment for the children. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1140 (“Some divorced parents may conduct
such religious upbringing disputes in a more acrimonious and injurious manner than parents who remain married, and thereby create greater risk of harm to their children in more such cases.”).
242. Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.
243. Id. This holding is typical in New York courts, but may not necessarily be true in other jurisdictions. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144.
244. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
245. See supra Part IV.
246. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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***
Picture this: The parents of an estranged family push and pull at the judiciary who, spurred by the albatross of constitutional propriety, tightrope the
line between religious freedom and religious agreements.247 What is forgotten
in the scramble for the biggest piece of the custodial pie?248 Regrettably, the
story’s protagonist—the child.249 Fifty pages and three decades of dragging
the First Amendment from pillar to post later, what is, after all, the best interest of that child?250 Perhaps a less loaded question would be, what is not in
the child’s best interest?251 When a contract foreordains the forever-interest
of the child, little wiggle room is left for changes of heart, expansion of mind,
and freedom of spirit.252 The writings in the custody contract, then, become
the writings on the cradle wall.253 While lacking jurisdiction to expunge these
writings, the First Amendment at least keeps the cradle door open by safeguarding parents’ Free Exercise rights and promising nonpartisanship in religious warfare.254 To that end, when a contract raises its sword in a child custody dispute, Chavie, Etty, and the women before and after them, are safe
behind the shield of the American Bill of Rights.255

247. See Ausch v. Ausch, 67 N.Y.S.3d 489, 489–90 (App. Div. 2018); Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at
275; Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60, 62–63 (App. Div. 1984).
248. See, e.g., Weisberger, 60 N.Y.S.3d at 275.
249. See, e.g., id.
250. See discussion supra Section III.A. The “best interest of the child” is the touchstone of custodial analysis. See discussion supra Section III.A.
251. See discussion supra Section III.A.
252. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[E]nforcement would be
contrary to a public policy embodied in the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
(as well as their state equivalents) that parents be free to doubt, question, and change their beliefs, and
that they be free to instruct their children in accordance with those beliefs.”).
253. “The writing on the wall” is an idiom that portends a destiny of misfortune. See THE FREE
DICTIONARY, https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/the+writing+on+the+wall (last visited Sept. 23,
2019).
254. See discussion supra Part IV; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
255. See Bill of Rights of the United States of America (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE,
https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2019). The
Bill of Rights are compromised of the first ten Amendments of the Constitution. Id. Since the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause fall under the First Amendment, they fall within the Bill of
Rights. Id.
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